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Alexa, Amazon Assistant or Government 
Informant? 
Julia R. Shackleton, Esq.* 
Alexa, are you listening to me? Technology has become an 
integral part of one’s everyday life with voice-controlled devices 
pervading our most intimate interactions and spaces within the 
home. The answers to our questions are now at our fingertips with 
the simple roll of the tongue “Alexa,” your very own personal 
intelligence assistant. This futuristic household tool can perform 
tasks that range from answering simple voice commands to 
ordering any online shopping. However, the advent of voice 
technology presents a myriad of problems. Concerns arise as 
these new devices live in the privacy of our homes while quietly 
listening for a “wake word” to record us—whether knowingly or 
unbeknownst to the owner or those nearby. This information is 
thereafter collected by Amazon and stored on its server. 
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment evolved through case law to 
provide citizens with protections when in the intimacy of one’s 
home. Despite these protections, the third-party doctrine peels 
away a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy when data or 
information is exposed to third parties. 
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Thus, the question posed is whether there is any Fourth 
Amendment protection when information is digitally shared with 
other third parties, such as Amazon’s Alexa? Further, what is 
even considered one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
modern digital world? Our generation is accustomed to 
surrendering a vast amount of personal and private information, 
particularly from current whereabouts through Facebook and 
Instagram check-ins and recent inquiries that are stored in search 
engine histories. This leaves an ascertainable digital trail to track 
where you have been, who your friends and family are, and even 
what you are thinking. How much of this digital information is 
obtainable by the government? Can this futuristic device—
Amazon’s Alexa—that we keep on our nightstands or kitchen 
tables actually be used against us? 
Part I of this comment will present a series of murder cases that 
demonstrate the current legal stance of trial courts on this 
particular legal issue. Part II will describe how Alexa works and 
why Amazon would want to gather this information. Part III 
recapitulates the evolution of Fourth Amendment case law, 
particularly the privacy in a search, the admissibility for a man’s 
private papers to be used as evidence against himself, and the 
sanctity of a man’s home. Part IV discusses third-party doctrine 
case law and how this strips away all Fourth Amendment 
protections, and Part V analyzes the prior case law and proposes 
a modern application to the third-party doctrine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology has evolved at an unprecedented rate. Unfortunately, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not advanced at such great speed. 
The emergence of smart device technology has enabled us to live a life of 
ease, granting us accessibility to a mass amount of information and 
allowing us to always stay connected. Today, we can use a smart device 
to automate a text, surf the web, and to navigate to a location we have 
never been before. However, it is daunting that these devices are always 
tracking us and our search histories are saved as stored data by our 
providers and manufacturers. 
A. Alexa, remind me to never ask you how to destroy evidence of 
murder 
Richard Baribault, a man convicted of first degree murder, inter alia, 
is an exemplar of how invasive and incriminating smart devices can be.1 
In the early hours of the morning on August 1, 2015, a sailing nomad, 
affectionately known in the community as “Captain Fredy,” was strangled 
to death on his boat in Warwick Cove Marina, Rhode Island.2 Captain 
Fredy’s body was not discovered until fifteen hot summer days later, after 
the body was almost unrecognizable due to its decomposition.3 As 
                                                                                                             
1 Ethan Hartley, Baribault found guilty in murder of Capt. Fredy, WARWICK BEACON 
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Warwick Police investigated the scene, the only telling evidence was 
motion-sensor video surveillance that, when activated, captured random 
moments during the murder and post clean-up.4 However, due to the boat’s 
far distance from the camera and the distortion of the image, the murderer 
was unascertainable.5 
As Warwick Police interviewed Captain Fredy’s marina neighbors, 
the investigators accrued a litany of individuals whom might have 
information about the murder.6 Among those individuals was Richard 
Baribault. As law enforcement began interviewing Baribault,7 they asked 
for Baribault’s consent to search his phone.8 The phone extraction revealed 
that Baribault had a Google application on his phone.9 The extraction also 
provided the password to Baribault’s Google account.10 The detectives 
then logged into Baribault’s account from a separate computer, which 
rendered access to his account.11 The detectives listened to Baribault’s 
automated recordings of his google searches and were able to identify his 
voice. His inquiries were as follows: 
On August 3, 2015 at 7:56 am – Does bleach kill 
everything including skin cells? 
On August 3, 2015 at 8:11 am – Boat moto mechanic in 
Warwick, Rhode Island? 
On August 6, 2015 at 12:14 pm – What towns have 
garbage days Friday morning? 
On August 6, 2015 at 12:14 pm – What towns in Rhode 
Island have garbage days garbage pickup Friday 
morning? 
On August 8, 2015 at 4:09 pm – Where would Warwick 
Harbormaster take a towed boat?12 
                                                                                                             
4 Id. 
5 See id. 
6 Warwick Police Department Incident Report #15-3829-OF. 
7 Of note, Law Enforcement in Rhode Island is not required to obtain a warrant to seize 
such information. However, it is common practice for the police force to obtain a warrant. 
Likewise, the Attorney General’s office of Rhode Island also engages in same practice. 
Moreover, each state has its own standard protocol, but this requirement is not compelled 
by any form of legal precedent. 
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Thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant to acquire from his 
provider his cell phone data—such as, call records, location data, and other 
cell phone content.13 Baribault’s cell phone, like all cell phones, was 
tracking his location at every second and could show his location based on 
the coordinates that the closest cell tower was tracking.14 Ultimately, the 
location information provided the most incriminating evidence as 
Baribault’s location matched the location and the time that the video 
surveillance activated during the time of the murder and post clean-up.15 
However, the voice recordings of the previously listed inquiries were 
played during his trial and, most likely, had one of the greatest impacts on 
the jury. Without this information from Baribault’s smart device, there 
may have never been enough information to track him and solve this 
murder. Yet, finding the murderer was at the expense of his own privacy. 
Indeed, Baribault consented to search his phone, but it is unclear if 
Baribault was fully aware of the information he surrendered to the 
police—GPS location tracking his every second, search engine history, 
and overly incriminating voice recording inquiries. The other question this 
case raises is whether the reasonable person is aware that information, 
such as the location that is tracked every second, is stored information that 
is obtainable by the government. Moreover, information that can be 
obtained even without a warrant in some jurisdictions. 
B. Subpoena power over Amazon’s Alexa records. 
In another murder case, State v. Bates, officers from the Bentonville, 
Arkansas, Police Department were placed in a similar situation—an 
unsolved murder case coupled with smart home technology located at the 
scene of the crime.16 As detectives investigated the murder, they found an 
Amazon Echo Dot.17 After the discovery of the Amazon Echo, law 
enforcement seized the Echo and subpoenaed Amazon, claiming there was 
reason to believe Amazon.com was in possession of records associated 
with the homicide.18 
                                                                                                             
13 Ethan Hartley, Baribault found guilty in murder of Capt. Fredy, WARWICK BEACON 
(Jul. 5, 2017 12:45 PM), http://warwickonline.com/stories/baribault-found-guilty-in-
murder-ofcapt-fredy,125784. 
14 See id. 
15 State of Rhode Island v. Richard Baribault, K1-2016-0069B 
16 See generally Complaint, State v. Bates, 2016 WL 7587405 (Ark. Cir. Aug. 26, 2016) 
(No. CR20160370). 
17 Amy B. Wang, Police Land Amazon Echo Data in Quest to Solve Murder, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (March 9, 2017, 11:08 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology
/ct-amazon-echo-murder-wp-bsi-20170309-story.html. 
18 Id. 
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Law Enforcement demanded records of the Amazon Echo device, 
alleging that the Amazon Echo stored recorded statements that would 
contain highly probative evidence of the incident—specifically, evidence 
that would discredit Bates’ alibi. Additionally, Bates’ water meter 
revealed that a substantial amount of water was used right after the murder 
was suspected to occur.19 This led investigators to believe the patio and 
hot tub was hosed down prior to the arrival of the police.20 Additionally, 
investigators learned that music was being played on the back patio at the 
time of Collin’s death that could have been played by Amazon’s personal 
intelligence assistant, Alexa.21 
Amazon initially opposed the warrant, claiming that the police 
department did not affirmatively establish that their investigation 
outweighs the customer’s privacy rights.22 Specifically, Amazon stated, 
the company “will not release customer information without a valid and 
binding legal demand properly served on us.”23 The Brenton County 
prosecutor moved to compel Amazon to provide the data that Bates’ Echo 
may have collected.24 According to court documents, Bates’ attorney did 
not object to the motion and agreed that Bates would voluntarily provide 
opposing counsel with the data collected.25 Later that day, Amazon 
delivered the data per the customer’s consent.26 
Although Bates voluntarily consented to the production of the 
Amazon Echo records, this personal device that records our mental 
impressions and inquiries, overheard conversations, and other unknown 
statements is attainable information that the government can seize and use 
against us under the third-party doctrine. Nonetheless, most people in 
                                                                                                             
19 Nicole Chavez, Arkansas Judge Drops Murder Charge in Amazon Echo Case, CNN 
(December 2, 2017, 12:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/amazon-echo-
arkansas-murder-case-dismissed/index.html. 
20 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect Oks Amazon to Hand Over Echo Recordings in Murder 
Case, CNN (April 26, 2017, 2:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-
echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case/; see also Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith 
Allen, Alexa Can You Help with This Murder Case? CNN (December 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-
case-trnd/index.html. 
21 McLaughlin, supra note 20. 
22 Id. 
23 Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged on Evidence 
From Amazon Echo, NPR (November 29, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/11/29/567305812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-
on-evidence-from-amazon-echo (citing Arkansas Judge Drops Murder Charge in Amazon 
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society are oblivious to the third-party doctrine and the accessibility the 
government has over our private matters. Therefore, consumers are often 
uncertain of what privacy protections apply when it involves this 
extremely invasive technology that lives in the presence of one’s home. 
Amazon’s Alexa recordings have a similar nature to the traditional 
wiretap, however; Alexa’s ability to answer any and all of our questions 
reveals a greater deal of information than a mere recording from a 
microphone. It reveals our questions, mental processes, and inner thoughts 
that ultimately reflect a wealth of information concerning a person’s 
familial, political, professional, and religious affiliations. 
Arguably, this information demands greater privacy protections than 
the home. However, the Fourth Amendment fails to provide the adequate 
privacy protection for smart technology devices. Justice Scalia in Kyllo v. 
United States proclaimed that “all details [in the home] are intimate 
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”27 Yet, Amazon’s Alexa—a personal effect within the home—does 
not receive such protection. In light of the advancement of technology, the 
Court may have to reconsider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in order 
to afford society with its reasonable expectation of privacy when using 
these invasive digital devices, especially in the sanctity of one’s home. 
C.  What does Amazon do with all of this stored data? 
Although Alexa provides convenience to its users, it undermines and 
diminishes one’s privacy through its third-party interconnectivity. In order 
to get full use out of Alexa’s skills, the user will ask Alexa’s queries or 
commands. Alexa’s responses are answered through her connection to 
third-party services, such as, but not limited to, other smart home devices, 
apps, or any website that Alexa accesses. The information that each user 
provides to Alexa is also voluntarily given to every other third party that 
Alexa uses in order to answer the query or command.28 However, 
unbeknownst to most Alexa users, every Alexa owner entered into an 
agreement with Amazon’s Digital Services LLC before they even used 
Amazon’s Alexa.29 This agreement renders all information to Amazon and 
other third-party users when using this smart device. Amazon even 
promotes that, “Alexa is Amazon’s cloud-based voice service available on 
                                                                                                             
27 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (alteration in original). 
28 Why Alexa?, AMAZON, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa (last visited January 26, 
2018). 
29 Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=201809740, (last visited January 26, 2018). 
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tens of millions of devices from Amazon and third-party device 
manufacturers.”30 
Alexa is controlled by the voice of each user.31 During the user’s voice 
interactions, Alexa streams the audio to the Amazon cloud.32 Amazon then 
processes and retains each user’s voice command or query in the Amazon 
server,33 including your voice inputs, music playlists, Alexa’s to-dos, and 
shopping lists.34 Moreover, this information is also transmitted to the third-
party service or auxiliary product that is related to the command or quest.35 
In the Alexa terms of use agreement, Amazon informs the reader that 
Amazon may exchange related information to a third-party service.36 For 
instance, if a user simply asks, “Alexa, what is the weather like today?” 
Amazon will relay your current zip code to the third party weather service 
it uses to answer your query.37 Although this example seems minor in 
scale, further use of Alexa creates an outgrowth of information that is 
given to other third-party networks and all networks that the third party 
associates with.38 Amazon warns those who even bother to read its terms 
and use agreement that, “[y]our use of any Third Party Service is subject 
to this Agreement and any third party terms applicable to such Third Party 
Service . . . [i]f you do not accept the third party terms applicable to a 
Third Party Service, do not use that Third Party Service.”39 
However, the issue is that most of Alexa’s owners have not even read 
Alexa’s Terms of Use Agreement, let alone know that Alexa’s 
interconnection activity subjects them to other companies’ conditional Use 
of Terms Agreements. Every time a person uses Alexa, they are disclosing 
information, which inevitably turns into a treasure trove of information 
that has the possibility to circulate to public websites or allows for 
government tracking.40 Furthermore, Amazon’s Terms of Use Agreement 
specifically states, “[w]hen using a Third Party Service, you are 
responsible for any information you provide to the third party. Amazon 
has no responsibility or liability for Third Party Services. Publishers of 
                                                                                                             
30 AMAZON, supra note 28. 







38 Steven I. Friedland, Drinking from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance 
from the Internet of Things is Changing the Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 897 
(2017). 
39 AMAZON, supra note 29. 
40 Friedland, supra note 38, at 392. 
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Third Party Services may change or discontinue the functionality or 
features of their Third Party Service.”41 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment declares, it is “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . “42 The Fourth Amendment implements 
constitutional limits on law enforcement’s authority to conduct a “search” 
or “seizure.”43 A “search” transpires when: (1) the intrusion constitutes a 
common law physical trespass and invades a “constitutionally protected 
area”44 within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment;45 (2) for the purpose 
of obtaining information or attempting to find something;46 and (3) the 
reasonable expectation privacy test survives despite a lack of physical 
trespass.47 
Fourth Amendment protections have evolved from those originally 
grounded in notions of physical trespass.48 Over time, the pendulum began 
to swing away from property notions and towards a more individualistic 
approach, which sought to protect the person, not the place.49 The 
transformation of the Fourth Amendment’s underlying rationale was 
largely due to the advances in technological development.50 It was not 
necessarily the physical intrusion itself that violated the Fourth 
Amendment, but rather whether a person manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search and whether 
society was willing to recognize that expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.51 However, under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed 
to third parties.52 This note will analyze the Fourth Amendment protection 
                                                                                                             
41 AMAZON, supra note 29. 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
43 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014). 
44 “Constitutionally protected areas” includes places such as one’s person, houses, 
papers, and effects. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
45 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 78 (1967) (Black, J. dissenting); see also United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
46 Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of “Search” in the 
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541 (1988). 
47 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
48 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438 (1928). 
49 See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (1967). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
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in light of the development of smart home devices, such as Amazon’s 
Alexa. 
A. The evolution of the Fourth Amendment: Have we lost sight of 
the purpose of an unreasonable search? 
Throughout the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
United States Supreme Court has varied in its interpretation of what the 
Fourth Amendment protects. The original concept of a Fourth Amendment 
search was illustrated by the Court in Olmstead v. United States in 1928.53 
The petitioners in Olmstead were convicted in the District Court for the 
Western District of Washington for conspiring to violate the National 
Prohibition Act by unlawfully possessing, transporting and importing 
intoxicating liquors and maintaining nuisances, and by selling intoxicating 
liquors.54 
The information that led to the discovery of the conspiracy, along with 
its nature and extent, was obtained by intercepting telephone conversations 
of the conspirators by a federal officer.55 The interceptions occurred from 
small wires that were inserted along the outside telephone wires from the 
residences of the petitioners and those leading from their office.56 The 
insertions were made without trespassing on the petitioners’ property, as 
the wiretapping insertions were affixed on public streets close to the 
petitioners’ homes.57 The Court found that there was no search under the 
Fourth Amendment because the electronic eavesdropping occurred 
without physical intrusion.58 The crux of Justice Taft’s analysis hinged on 
the inquiry of whether the underlying action by the federal officers 
happened inside the home.59 Thus, because the evidence seized was not 
obtained by physical intrusion into one’s home, but rather obtained only 
though hearing—no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.60 At this time, 
the analysis of the Fourth Amendment search inquired into whether there 
was physical intrusion on one’s property; thus, the Fourth Amendment 
protected property, not the person. 
The precedent set forth by the Olmstead Court was later overruled in 
Katz v. United States in 1967.61 The petitioner in Katz was convicted in 
the District Court for the Southern District of California for transmitting 
                                                                                                             
53 See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438. 
54 Id. at 455. 
55 Id. at 456. 
56 Id. at 456–57. 
57 Id. at 457. 
58 Id. at 464. 
59 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438, 464 (1928). 
60 Id. 
61 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and 
Boston in violation of a federal statute.62 During trial, the Government was 
allowed to introduce evidence that the petitioner objected to on grounds of 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.63 Specifically, the evidence in 
question involved federal agents attaching an electronic listening and 
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth, which the 
petitioner placed his calls from.64 The Katz Court renounced the 
underpinnings of the Olmstead Court and held that physical trespass is no 
longer the controlling law under the Fourth Amendment.65 The Katz Court 
noted that the Government’s actions—electronically listening and 
recording the petitioner’s conversation—violated the privacy upon which 
he “justifiably relied while using the telephone booth. Such actions 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”66 Importantly, the Court asserted that there was no 
constitutional significance to the fact that the electronic device did not 
penetrate or physically invade the phone booth.67 
Justice Harlan, writing a separate concurring opinion in Katz, set forth 
a two-prong test, which the Supreme Court later endorsed in Bond v. 
United States.68 Determining whether a search is reasonable requires: (1) 
the person to have manifested an actual subjective expectation of privacy; 
and (2) this expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.69 Concerning the first prong of this test, Justice Harlan 
emphasized how one’s personal aspect of privacy and their own subjective 
expectations of privacy can be inferred from their conduct.70 Regarding 
the facts of Katz, Justice Harlan found it significant that the petitioner shut 
the door behind him when using the phone booth, thus demonstrating his 
expectation that his conversation will be private.71 The Katz framework 
changed the analysis of whether a search is reasonable to focus on the 
subjective expectation of privacy. This shifts away from the past emphasis 
of property notions. The Katz Court found that the petitioner did in fact 
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy as he entered the phone booth 
in an attempt to exclude the “uninvited ear.”72 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 348. 
65 Id. at 353. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000). 
69 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 352. 
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However, the notions of physical intrusion may have been resurrected 
in United States v. Jones.73 The United States Supreme Court found that 
the government conducted an unlawful search when federal agents placed 
a GPS tracking device on the car of the respondent, which tracked the 
movements of the respondent over the course of 28 days.74 The respondent 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence gained from the GPS, as the 
information collected not only his movements on public streets, but also 
when his vehicle was parked inside the garage of the home. In the majority 
opinion, Justice Scalia revived the property notion of an unreasonable 
search by stating, “as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”75 
Although this case was ultimately decided on trespass notions, Justice 
Sotomayor notified the Court in her concurrence about the detrimental 
effects of the property-based test in the future.76 Sotomayor opined that, 
due to the surge in use of technology, this test potentially chills one’s 
associational and expressive freedoms.77 Significantly, this is imperative 
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of 
privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.78 Sotomayor additionally 
foretold the privacy concerns as it relates to Amazon’s Alexa and the third-
party doctrine: 
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider 
the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course 
of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone 
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; 
the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with 
which they correspond to their Internet service providers; 
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase 
to online retailers.79 
Justice Sotomayor notably indicated that the third-party doctrine 
needs to be reexamined, particularly as we enter this new world of digital 
                                                                                                             
73 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
74 Id. at 402. 
75 Id. at 409. 
76 Id. at 414. 
77 Id. at 416. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 417. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 313 
 
technology that possesses the power of retrieving detailed information, 
such as what we are thinking, who are we intimately involved with, or 
where we are located. In light of the third-party doctrine’s broad power, 
an officer can circumvent a warrant through subpoenaing information of 
third-party service parties. Thus, this doctrine not only enables law 
enforcement to arbitrarily exercise police surveillance, it encourages it. 
B. Privacy within the home: Kyllo’s impact 
As noted above, Amazon’s Alexa is commonly found within the 
owner’s home, either in one’s kitchen, living room, or nightstand. This 
presents a problem because the personal assistant is kept within the 
intimacy of one’s home: Does the third-party doctrine penetrate through 
one’s home and allow for the government to seize data containing 
conversations, sometimes conversations that were unknowingly recorded? 
Moreover, these personal assistants, which are pervading into everyday 
life through the use of other smart home technologies, can be used as 
surveillance tools in order to investigate any individual. Typically, courts 
have honored the home and what occurs therein, holding it is an intimate 
place of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme court determined whether the 
use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public 
street to detect relative amounts of heat within a home constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.80 The Court persisted with, “‘[i]t would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.’”81 Ultimately, the Court found that the information regarding 
the interior of the home that could not have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search—and 
especially so when the technology in question is not in general public 
use.82 The Court reasoned that accepting the information attained by the 
thermal-imaging device would “leave the homeowner at the mercy of 
advancing technology . . . that could discern all human activity in the 
home.”83 Specifically, the Court described the intimate details advancing 
technologies could pick up, “for example, at what hour each night the lady 
of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would 
consider ‘intimate’; and a much more sophisticated system detect nothing 
more intimate than the fact that someone left a closet light on.”84 
                                                                                                             
80 533 U.S. 27, 30 (2001). 
81 Id. at 33. 
82 Id. at 34. 
83 Id. at 35–36. 
84 Id. at 38. 
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Interestingly, this is exactly the issue with advancing technologies, 
like Alexa, and the government’s ability to search troves of data controlled 
by companies, like Amazon. Now, under the third-party doctrine, an 
officer does not even need to bother with obtaining a search warrant and 
searching the house because the law already allows the government to 
search the data of any third-party service. Particularly with Alexa though, 
intimate details are potentially traceable from this personal assistant. For 
instance, the device could accidentally awake and record a vehement 
discussion between husband and wife. 
Conversely, the Kyllo Court also stated, “the Fourth Amendment 
protection of the home has never been extended to require law 
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public 
thoroughfares.” In relation to personal assistant devices, alternatively, an 
individual does voluntarily welcome these technologies into their home. 
Thus, under their own assumption of risk, they are arguably accountable 
for any consequences that pursue. 
C. Privacy in one’s private papers 
Prior to the inception of the third-party doctrine, the United States 
Supreme Court decided that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to compel an individual to produce his or her own private papers.85 In 
Boyd, several cases of glass were confiscated from the defendants pursuant 
to customs revenue law.86 Thereafter, the district attorney subpoenaed the 
defendants to produce invoices concerning the seized plates of glass. 87 
However, the defendants raised the question of whether it was 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment to compel the defendants to 
produce private papers that could be used as evidence against him for the 
purposes of an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth 
Amendment.88 
The Boyd Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects against the 
invasion into a person’s private matters and will not allow the government 
to compel a person to produce private papers.89 The Court delved into the 
history and reasoning behind the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search 
and seizures, specifically the issuance of the writs of assistance.90 The 
practice enabled revenue officers to issue writs of assistance, which 
empowered them to use arbitrary and sole discretion to search suspected 
                                                                                                             
85 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
86 Id. at 617. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 619. 
89 Id. at 624. 
90 Id. at 625. 
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places for smuggled goods. James Otis pronounced it was the “worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and 
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law 
book . . . [because] the liberty of every man [was placed] in the hands of 
every petty officer.”91 The writs of assistance authorized customs officers 
to enter and inspect houses without any warrant.92 Moreover, customs 
officers could obtain a writs of assistance without even alleging any illegal 
activity that would precondition the search.93 The Boyd Court noted that it 
was the writ of assistance that inaugurated the resistance of the colonies 
against Great Britain, which ultimately led to the Fourth Amendment’s 
unreasonable searches and seizures.94 The Court further noted that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to all invasions on the part of the government 
involving the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of his life.95 
Notably, the Court indicated that is it not the physical trespass, such 
as rummaging through a person’s drawers, that constitutes an 
unreasonable search.96 However, it is “the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that 
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.”97 
This notion of personal liberty aligns with the underlying premise of Katz, 
which endorses the concept that the Fourth Amendment protects the 
person, not the place.98 
Specifically pertaining to the facts surrounding Boyd, it is the forcible 
and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony through his private 
papers—used as evidence against him—that contradicts the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.99 The Court reasoned that the compulsory production 
of a man’s private paper to be used in evidence against him is equivalent 
to compelling him to be a witness against himself in contradiction of the 
Fifth Amendment.100 In light of the Fourth Amendment, the compulsory 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. (quoting Cooley, Const. Lim. 301–303; John Adams, vol. 2, Appendix A, pp. 523–
525; vol. 10, pp. 183, 233, 244, 256, etc., and in Quincy’s Reports, pp. 469–482; and see 
Paxton’s Case, Id. 51–57). 
92 See generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original 
Meaning, 602-1791, at 758–59 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont 
Graduate School) (available from UMI Dissertation Services, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann 
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93 Id. at 762–63. 
94 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. 
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production that coerces an individual to turn over their private papers 
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.101 
III. THE GROWTH AND CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE THIRD-
PARTY DOCTRINE 
Under the third-party doctrine, an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the information that he or she 
voluntarily disclosed to a third-party.102 This doctrine initiated in the 
1970’s and was solidified by Smith v. Maryland in 1979.103 Currently, the 
application of the third-party doctrine strips an individual of his or her 
Fourth Amendment protection, which allows the government to access 
information rendered to a third party without a warrant.104 Although at first 
glance this case law precedent may not seem alarming, modern technology 
requires an individual to surrender a digital trail of their daily life in order 
to participate in our technological world. Knowing the government can 
access this information without a warrant leaves the masses uneasy. 
Almost all of our personal information is disclosed to a third-party 
service provider. For instance, our personal and intimate text message 
conversations between our significant other or close friends; our e-mails 
to our superiors regarding potentially privileged work matters; our credit 
card statements and banking transactions; and our check-ins through 
Facebook and Instagram all reveal a wealth of information about our 
personal lives without any form of protection. Under the Katz test, the 
standard remains that the reasonable person must have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the activity that is searched for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.105 But, is it that the average person in today’s world 
does not value their right to privacy by constantly sharing intimate details 
about their life through Snapchat and other third-party service providers? 
Or is it that the right to privacy is no longer existent for those who 
participate in this digital world? 
                                                                                                             
101 Id. at 622. 
102 Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and The Fourth Amendment Limits 
of The Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (2017). 
103 See United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979). 
104 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 
(2009) (defining the third party doctrine). 
105 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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A.  Origination of the third-party doctrine: Couch v. United States 
After the establishment of the reasonable expectation test in Katz, the 
Court was faced with the question of whether the Fourth Amendment 
protects information conveyed to a third party. The third-party doctrine 
originated in Couch v. United States in 1973.106 After the petitioner was 
suspected for a potential tax liability, the Government summoned the 
petitioner’s accountant to provide all records, bank statements, cancelled 
checks, workpapers, and other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax 
liability of the petitioner.107 The petitioner raised the argument that the 
confidential nature of the accountant-client relationship and, 
consequently, her expectation of privacy that existed when she handed 
over her private records protects her under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment from their production.108 The Court found that the 
accountant-client privilege does not exist under federal law and, 
furthermore, no state-created privilege has been acknowledged in federal 
cases.109 
The Couch Court continued and addressed the Fourth Amendment 
precedent set forth in Boyd concerning an individual’s private papers.110 
The Court noted that there is a minimal expectation of privacy where 
records are voluntarily given to an accountant while under the 
understanding that mandatory disclosure is required for an income tax 
return.111 Furthermore, the information disclosed was in the possession of 
the third-party service, the accountant, not the petitioner.112 Therefore, the 
petitioner cannot reasonably claim Fourth Amendment protection for the 
purposes of privacy.113 The Couch Court also addressed the argument that 
the Fifth Amendment protects compulsory production of the petitioner’s 
documents because it is a form of self-incrimination.114 However, the 
Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination is an intimate 
and personal one, which defers to a private inner sanctum of individual 
feeling and thought, not to information that may incriminate an 
individual.115 Ultimately, under the Couch ruling, personal information 
                                                                                                             
106 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
107 Id. at 323. 
108 Id. at 335. 
109 Id.; see also Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 459, 463–64 (6th Cir. 1951); see also 
Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949). 
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that is voluntarily given to a third party renders an individual with no 
expectation of privacy, which is daunting precedent considering today’s 
digital world in which mass amounts of information are transmitted by 
third-party service providers.116 
B. Banking statements: private papers that are protected? 
The Court again addressed the question of the third-party doctrine in 
United States v. Miller, where the government accessed the suspect’s 
banking statements and records—without a warrant.117 The Miller Court 
denied the defendant’s motion to suppress subpoenaed banking documents 
because the Court found there was no legitimate Fourth Amendment 
interest that was implicated by the government’s investigation; 
specifically, there was no governmental intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected zone of privacy that the defendant relied on.118 The Miller Court 
highlighted the Katz expectation of privacy test and quoted, “in Katz the 
Court also stressed ‘what a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is 
not subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’” 
Thus, it reaffirmed that information conveyed to a third-party service 
provider is not warranted Fourth Amendment protection. The Court 
distinguished the subpoenaed banking records from the documents in 
Boyd, indicating that the banking statements and records here do not 
constitute “private papers.”119 Rather, the documents consist of business 
records that belong to the bank; therefore, the defendant cannot assert 
ownership nor possession on the claim for an illegal seizure.120 The Court 
specifically stated, 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed 
in the third party will not be betrayed.121 
                                                                                                             
116 Note, supra note 102, at 1929. 
117 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
118 Id. at 440. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 442. 
121 Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 300 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
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Therefore, what actually is a person’s reasonable expectation in a 
world where, in order to subsist, one must rely on other third-party service 
providers to maintain a job, pay taxes, and communicate with friends and 
family? 
Although the defendant in Miller did voluntarily and knowingly 
transact with the bank, it is imperative to note that the documents requested 
in Miller are the functional equivalent of the private papers compelled in 
Boyd. The private papers in Boyd were invoices constituting the sale or 
record of the fraudulently purchased glass.122Alternatively, the documents 
in Miller consisted of deposit slips and copies of checks.123 Both 
documents comprise of sale transactions; however, the compelled 
documents in Miller involved a third party. Arguably, the main difference 
is caused by the modernization and accessibility of banking. Today, an 
individual can remotely deposit a personal check online or through a 
picture on their mobile phone.124 Additionally, restricted banking hours no 
longer exist due to the creation of ATM machines.125 Indeed, the banking 
statements in Miller are not “private papers,” but it is vital to note the 
evolution of modern technology subjects a person to have no Fourth 
Amendment protections under the current precedent of the third-party 
doctrine. Mainly, one must either surrender their Fourth Amendment right 
or the courts must conclude that today’s digital world affects one’s 
expectation of privacy. 
C. No expectation of privacy in a pen register because people 
know of them 
The United States Supreme Court solidified the third-party doctrine in 
Smith v. Maryland, where the Court suppressed bank records and found 
that the government’s use of a pen register, a device that records the 
numbers dialed by a phone, did not constitute a search.126 After the victim 
received a number of harassing phone calls, law enforcement placed a pen 
register on the defendant’s telephone without a warrant.127 The defendant 
queried whether the installation and use of the pen register by the 
                                                                                                             
122 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
123 Miller, 425 U.S. at 437. 
124 How Do You Deposit a Check With your Smartphone or Tablet? FDIC, https://www.
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125 Linda Rodriguez McRobbie, The ATM is Dead. Long Live the ATM! THE 
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126 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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telephone company at the request of law enforcement constituted an 
unreasonable search and seizure.128 
The Court initiated its analysis with the application of the Katz test, 
affirming that the determination of an unreasonable search hinges on 
whether a person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, 
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded by the 
government.129 The Court then analyzed the nature of the activity that was 
investigated by the government when the device was installed.130 In 
regards to an actual expectation of privacy, subscribers are aware that they 
must convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to 
complete their phone calls.131 Moreover, it is well known that phone 
companies must make permanent records of the numbers they dial in order 
to generate permanent billing records.132 Pen registers are also a common 
use of practice by telephone companies for billing purposes.133 However, 
“[while] most people may be oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric 
functions, they presumably have some awareness of one common use.”134 
The Court opined that this must be common knowledge since most phone 
books inform subscribers in “Consumer Information” that they have the 
ability to identify unwelcome and troublesome phone calls.135 
The Smith Court also found there was no expectation of privacy in a 
dialed phone number because the pen register was installed on telephone 
company property at the telephone company’s central offices. The Court 
found the defendant cannot claim that his property was invaded or that the 
police intruded in a constitutionally protected area.136 Additionally, the 
Court noted that the information discovered by the pen register is minimal, 
such that they do not expose the substantive contents of the conversation 
between the caller and recipient.137 Therefore, under Smith’s precedent, an 
individual has no expectation of privacy from a warrantless government 
                                                                                                             
128 Id. at 738. 
129 Id. at 739; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978); id. at 150-51 
(concurring opinion); id. at 164 (dissenting opinion); see also United States v. Chadwick, 
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United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
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investigation involving information that was voluntarily rendered to a 
third-party service provider. 
However, Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion finding that 
recorded dialed phone numbers is no different than an electronically 
transmitted conversation; thus, the information gathered in Smith should 
fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.138 Notably, Justice 
Stewart illustrated that the Katz Court recognized the “[t]he role played by 
a private telephone is even more vital, and since Katz it has been 
abundantly clear that telephone conversations carried on by people in their 
homes or offices are fully protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”139 Moreover, it is evident through subsequent case law 
precedent that telephone conversations between a caller and recipient are 
provided Fourth Amendment protections.140 The dissent recognized that 
the majority opinion rested its argument on the theory that the caller is 
aware the telephone number dialed is recorded by the telephone company, 
but the telephone conversation is also electronically transmitted by the 
telephone company and on its property.141 This information should also be 
afforded protection by the Fourth Amendment because it is derived from 
the private conduct within the home or office.142 Additionally, it is 
undisputed that an individual would not remain content if a list of their 
phone calls were publicly broadcasted to the world.143 Not because this 
information is incriminating, but rather because it “could reveal the 
identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most 
intimate details of a person’s life.”144 
Since Smith v. Maryland in 1979, the third-party doctrine has 
remained relatively untouched. Courts have applied the doctrine with 
relative uniformity, applying it to information disclosed to internet service 
providers,145 cell site data,146 bank records,147 employment records,148 and 
cell phone records.149 However, this lodestar decision was issued over 
                                                                                                             
138 Id. at 746. 
139 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (emphasis added)). 
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322 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:301 
 
thirty years before the use of mobile phones, laptops, and most 
importantly, digital personal assistants. This doctrine is outdated. 
IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN AN INTERNET 
INFUSED WORLD 
In a foregoing time, a person had control over their own information—
personal documents of banking or business transactions existed on a sheet 
of paper that the person possessed in their file cabinets.150 The scribbles 
and intimate handwritten notations in one’s diary would be safely tucked 
away under their pillow or buried in their nightstand.151 Letters from one’s 
dearly loved ones written on parchment paper would be housed in their 
slant front desk.152 All of one’s papers and personal information were 
privately stored within the home. Importantly, if the government wanted 
to inquire about one’s personal information, it was required under the 
Fourth Amendment for the government to obtain a warrant to search one’s 
home.153 
Now, in a world with ever-changing technology, the government can 
track a person through the use of data that is broadcasted on a massive 
scale without ever obtaining a warrant.154 Under the third-party doctrine, 
if one’s personal information is in the hands of a third-party service, even 
if unknowingly, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.155 Yes, there 
is absolutely no Fourth Amendment protection. But, how can that be? 
Does that mean the government can view my recent purchases made with 
my credit card? Yes, because that information is also in the hands of your 
bank. What about my text messages between my husband? Yes, because 
those text messages are shared with both your telephone provider and 
potentially the manufacturer of your phone. Could the government even 
see what I am movie I am streaming on my laptop? Yes, because Netflix 
or whichever service provider you are using has a record of it. 
What information was once safely kept private and sound in the 
intimacy of our homes is now essentially public information that is easily 
accessible by the government. Moreover, this is no minimal amount of 
information that is easily accessible. It is infinite. “Consumer reporting 
agencies have data about where you live, your financial accounts, and your 
history of paying your debts. Hospitals and insurance companies have your 
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health data.”156 But wait, there is more. The information on your 
Instagram, the people you search on Facebook, the stories you send to your 
friends on Snapchat are available to the government. Currently, legal 
scholars have denounced the law of search and seizure as 
“embarrassing”157 and “archaic.”158 The Fourth Amendment is struggling 
from both modern development in technology and the constitutional 
tension between formalists and realists.159 
A. Does the Fourth Amendment still carry the same spirit after the 
inception of the third-party doctrine and invention of Alexa? 
This Note began its Fourth Amendment analysis by delving into the 
origin of the Fourth Amendment search; specifically, how the Court 
defined a search and what dispositive factors queue to an unreasonable 
search. Importantly, Olmstead demonstrated that the Court, at that time, 
viewed an unreasonable search to transpire when there was a physical 
intrusion into one’s home—ultimately protecting one’s property, not the 
person. What is interesting about this test, in relation to Amazon’s Alexa, 
is that Alexa is property belonging to the owner, which would require a 
physical trespass in order to obtain its data. Also, Alexa is commonly kept 
inside the owner’s home, therefore, allowing law enforcement to enter into 
the home. The physical intrusion into the home could also stem from 
finding out whether the homeowner uses an Alexa through billing records, 
which would require law enforcement to obtain this data from other types 
of technology that are not used by the general public. 
This is explicitly what Justice Taft’s analysis hinged on—physical 
intrusion inside the home. Accordingly, under this test, the government’s 
search of obtaining Alexa without a warrant, which is the current standing 
case law, would not pass muster under Olmstead. It was not until the 
revelation of the third-party doctrine that retrieving this information 
without a warrant was considered reasonable. But was that the traditional 
intentions of the framers when enacting the Fourth Amendment? Indeed, 
Olmstead was decided more than a century after the Fourth Amendment 
was enacted. Nonetheless, other Fourth Amendment precedent decided 
closer to the enactment also supports and urges that the third-party 
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doctrine, as it pertains to Alexa, would not suffice under the original 
notions and purposes of the Fourth Amendment as evidenced in Boyd. 
The principle of Boyd v. United States was for a person to be secure 
in their home without government intrusion into a person’s private matters 
and personal papers. This holding was ultimately enforced to uphold the 
Fourth Amendment, which was enacted to prevent the common practice 
of writs of assistance. The framers were wary of these general warrants, as 
they granted revenue officers with arbitrary and sole discretion to search 
whomever without a warrant. Additionally, this included the right for an 
officer to even enter one’s home and inspect it. Interestingly, the third-
party doctrine grants the government with a very similar flavor of arbitrary 
and excessive discretion of the general warrants. The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment was not to solely ban the use of general warrants in the 
customs context specifically, but it was to prohibit the idea and the 
exercise of such broad discretion, particularly when it had to deal with 
one’s private papers or the home. Today, under the third-party doctrine, 
the government can engage in a similar practice that the Fourth 
Amendment and cases, such as Boyd, attempted to prevent from occurring. 
Thus, the hard question posed is what should members of American 
society expect in regard to their third-party information, information they 
never knowingly consented to sharing? Have we as a society knowingly 
given up our reasonable expectation of privacy in information about us? If 
we did not, what can we do other than acquiesce after the fact? Although 
the government will argue that, under one’s user agreement the company, 
can collect and use the data, but this is the equivalent of an adhesion 
contract.160 Moreover, the data collected by Amazon’s Alexa could be 
viewed as the modern-day private papers of an individual. It records our 
trail of thoughts and questions, which has similar characteristics to our 
mental notes that one would leave in their diary. Moreover, under the 
third-party doctrine, the government is legally allowed to obtain other 
personal information merely because the individual used a third-party 
service. 
Notably, in today’s world, an individual does not have much choice of 
using or not using these third-party services. For instance, one arguably 
needs to have an e-mail in today’s world in order to obtain a job at any 
entry level. Or one needs to have a cellular phone in order to keep in 
contact with other members of society given today’s mobile society where 
friends and family could live all over the world. Thus, given society’s 
current accessibility to travel and ease of communication, it is almost 
expected of an individual to swiftly respond to an e-mail within minutes 
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or the hour. Moreover, most of one’s daily tasks involves using a third-
party service provider. For instance, most people today make their daily 
purchases through a card, not cash.161 Also, getting the daily news is now 
commonly accessed online or through an app rather than receiving a 
newspaper. However, even if one still receives a particular newspaper, the 
purchase of that subscription requires a credit card. Therefore, in order to 
live in today’s world, an individual’s livelihood is at the mercy of third-
party services. 
B.  We still have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but 
something needs to change 
Nonetheless, there are two notable arguments to be made under the 
reasonable expectation of privacy. One argument relates to the liberty 
notion and personal autonym that was set forth in Katz. The second 
argument hinges on the property notion that Justice Scalia advocated for 
in Jones. Both are currently standing law and arguably equally applicable 
to determine whether a search is determined unreasonable. Moreover, 
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence in Jones, opined that determining 
whether a search is unreasonable is not only founded based on the property 
notion that the majority in Jones stated, but also determined on whether 
the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy. 
The Liberty Notion 
Under the liberty notion, Katz set forth that determining whether a 
search is reasonable requires the person: (1) to have manifested an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.162 In relation to using 
Amazon’s Alexa, it is possible that the individual is unknowingly being 
recorded by the device. Thus, if a husband and a wife get into an argument 
in the privacy of their bedroom, and Alexa unknowingly turns on and 
begins to record, the couple arguably had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with the unknown communication conveyed to Alexa. Factors 
involving this reasonable expectation of privacy would include that the 
couple decided to speak to one another within their home, within in their 
bedroom, and without their knowledge that Alexa recorded the 
conversation. Additionally, the couple could arguably make the point that 
that intimate conversation was never intended for the government to easily 
obtain. 
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Additionally, when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy, does the reasonable person know that all of this 
massive information is easily accessed information by the government? I 
would argue that most people are unaware that their bank accounts and 
text message conversations can be viewed without any compelling 
interest. As Justice Sotomayor eloquently queried, “I would ask whether 
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or 
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”163 
Moreover, granting the government with so much power allows for 
arbitrary discretion and potential abuse. As it stands right now, the third-
party doctrine enables the police to easily engage in police surveillance 
and monitoring of one’s daily life.164 
The Property Notion 
A stronger argument can be made by virtue of the property notion set 
forth in Jones, which held that a physical trespass by the government 
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Similar to the car in Jones, 
a person’s Alexa or Echo Dot is also their personal property that they 
possess. Moreover, similar to how the car in Jones was driven on public 
roads, the information shared to third parties is also public information. 
The Jones Court specifically rejected the government’s contention that 
there is no reasonable expectation on public roads; similarly, Alexa is 
shared information with Amazon. A search by the government without a 
warrant, however, is a physical trespass on the owner’s property, Alexa. 
Additionally, now with the ease of the digital world, law enforcement 
would not have to go through the extensive measures of even placing the 
tracking GPS on an automobile because, under the third-party doctrine, 
they can access our digital trail even without a warrant. 
However, in regard to the third-party doctrine, it is time to reconsider 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in this digital world. In Jones, 
Justice Sotomayor noted that the current third-party doctrine is ill suited 
to the digital age, where mass amounts of information are revealed by 
individuals to third parties.165 Moreover, it needs to be reconsidered as it 
becomes harder to function in the political, economic and social world 
without sharing electronical data, which leaves the public with a 
dissatisfaction in the law. Arguably, information disclosed to third parties 
can be determined as protected for purposes of a search under either the 
physical trespass test in Jones or the liberty interest test in Katz. 
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As Justice Stewart indicated in Smith in 1979, the majority of people 
would not remain content with having their personal information being 
publicly broadcasted.166 Not because this information is incriminating, but 
rather because this information reveals one’s personal and intimate life to 
all. This information reflects a wealth of detail concerning an individual’s 
familial, professional, political, religious, and sexual associations. 
Through this information obtained by third-party service providers, it 
would not be difficult to discover whether a person visited a therapist, has 
gone to an abortion clinic, had an intimate relationship with a person of 
the same sex, had an affair, or recently visited a strip club. The government 
can search one’s personal records that have been stored throughout one’s 
lifetime. Thus, a doctrine that grants such unfettered discretion to law 
enforcement and the government has the ability to chill one’s associational 
and expressive freedoms. Therefore, it is imperative for the Court to 
reconsider the third-party doctrine and use a narrower construction that 
would greatly limit the government’s ability to obtain an individual’s 
personal and private information. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Framers of the Constitution strongly advocated for the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the privacy of their documents and papers with their 
mental impressions and beliefs, particularly after their discontent with the 
British invading individuals’ privacy on the basis of using general 
warrants. Due to the broad use of the third-party doctrine, the government 
is granted similar general warrant power that the Fourth Amendment 
ultimately intended to prevent. Given that advancing technologies have 
created devices, such as Amazon’s Alexa, that can record our mental 
impressions, queries, commands, and conversations, either knowingly or 
unbeknownst, it is necessary for the government to place a narrower 
construction on the third-party doctrine. 
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